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Arbitration of Securities Disputes: Rodriguez and
New Arbitration Rules Leave Investors Holding a
Mixed Bag
W!.LIAm C. HERMANN*

INTRODUCTION

The 1980's were a boom decade for the capital valuation of corporate
America. The Dow Jones Industrial Average rose 1914.46 points, or 228.25
percent, over the decade.' This growth was fueled in part by public participation in the market. 2 With the growth, however, came closer media attention
to Wall Street's flaws. Headlines screamed of Boesky's fall, the crash of
October, 1987, and the settlement of criminal charges against the meanest
300 pound gorilla on the Street, Drexel Burnham Lambert, which left its
junk-bond financing whiz, Michael Milken, twisting in the wind. 3 This publicity at the end of the decade shook Wall Street to its very foundation,
threatening the public participation that helped create the boom. The volume
of trading by individual investors since 1987's "market correction" fell off
dramatically as investors became concerned that Wall Street's playing field is
not level. 4 The public's skepticism forcefully supports Justice Blackmun's
recent contention that "the industry's abuses towards investors are more
apparent than ever." 5
A development that might have the greatest impact on individual investors,
however, did not receive much attention in the popular press. The Supreme
Court made it clear, first in Shearson/AmericanExpress Inc. v. McMahon,6

* J.D. Candidate, 1990, Indiana University School of Law at Bloomington; B.A., 1983,
University of Notre Dame.
1. See Chicago Sun-Times, Jan. 2, 1990, at 45, col. 4; see also Wall St. J., Jan. 2, 1990,
chart at RI, col. 1.
2. In 1985, the Securities Industry Association estimated that over 47 million individuals
were shareowners of corporations in the United States. Letter from William J. Fitzpatrick, Senior
Vice President and General Counsel of the Securities Industry Association to Jonathan G. Katz,
Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, Securities Industry Association Response to SEC
Letter Dated June 3, 1988 Concerning Arbitration Clauses 8 (June 21, 1988) [hereinafter "SIA
Response Letter"] (copy on file at the Indiana Law Journal).
3. See Cohen, Criminal Charges Filed Against Drexel Indicate Alleged Wrongdoing by
Milken, Wall St. J., Jan. 25, 1989, at A4, col. 2.
4. See generally Laderman, The Crash Created a "Couch Potato" Market, Bus. WK., Apr.
18, 1988, at 60; Garcia, Caution Now Guides Anxious Investors, Wall St. J., Jan. 4, 1988, at
B3, col. 3.
5. Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 243 (1987) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
6. 482 U.S. at 220.
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and most recently in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express
Inc., 7 that pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate any claims a customer might
have against her broker will be enforced. Customers who agree to arbitrate
their claims will no longer have the option of pursuing remedies in the federal
courts. This pro-arbitration position of the Supreme Court effectively leaves
the SEC as the sole protector of individual investors.
In Part I this Note will address the McMahon and Rodriguez decisions,
and the foundation upon which they stand. Part II of this Note will then
examine the arbitration process, focusing on its benefits to consumers. Part
III, however, will argue that the arbitral forum is currently inadequate to
protect the rights given to investors by Congress from the erosion precipitated
by an activist Supreme Court. The Note concludes that the SEC, as the last
guardian of investors, should take action to protect the statutory rights of

investors in the securities market.
I.

Tim ROAD TO RoDRrGuEz

Congress has always intended to provide a judicial forum for securities
disputes. In section 22(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act),'
Congress granted jurisdiction over offenses and violations of the Securities
Act to the district courts of the United States and the United States courts
of any Territory. In section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Exchange Act), 9 Congress granted exclusive jurisdiction to the same federal
courts over violations of the Exchange Act.
Congress did not intend to allow the waiver of these statutory rights to a
judicial forum. Both section 14 of the Securities Act 0 and section 29(a) of
the Exchange Act" stipulate that conditions binding any person to waive

7. 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1988). The statute reads, in pertinent part:
The district courts of the United States and the United States courts of any Territory
shall have jurisdiction of offenses and violations under this subchapter and under
the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission in respect thereto, and,
concurrent with State and Territorial courts, of all suits in equity and actions at
law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this title.
Id.
9. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1988). The statute reads, in pertinent part:
The district courts of the United States and the United States courts of any Territory
or other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of violations of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder,
and of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or
duty created by this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder.
Id.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1988). The statute reads: "Any condition, stipulation, or provision
binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this
subchapter or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be void." Id.
11. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1988). The statute reads: "Any condition, stipulation, or provision
binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or
regulation thereunder, or of any rule of an exchange required thereby shall be void." Id.
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compliance with any provisions of these acts shall be void. These statutory
sections manifest congressional intent to provide and secure a judicial forum
for securities disputes. It is in the light of this clear congressional intent that
the McMahon and Rodriguez developments should be examined.
A.

The Wilko Doctrine

Prior to 1986, lower federal courts consistently invalidated boilerplate, predispute arbitration clauses contained in customer account agreements with
broker-dealers. 12 This accorded with congressional intent, as recognized by
the Supreme Court's opinion in Wilko v. Swan, 3 which held that the Securities
Act barred enforcement of such pre-dispute agreements regarding claims under
4
section 12(2) of the Securities Act.'
The Wilko Court held that section 12(2) created a right to select a judicial
forum that could not be waived because of the anti-waiver provisions of
section 14 of the Securities Act. 5 The Wilko Court reasoned that the
arbitration process was unlikely to adequately protect the federal policies
inherent in the securities statutes.
Lower federal courts regularly extended the Wilko reasoning to claims
arising under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act 16 and Rule lOb-5 17 through
the similar anti-waiver provision contained in section 29(a) of the Exchange
Act.' 8 However, two Supreme Court cases brought the practice of extending
Wilko to section 10(b) claims under considerable scrutiny. 9 These cases caused
a split among the federal courts when determining the arbitrability of claims
under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.7 0 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
in the McMahon case to resolve this conflict.2'
B.

The McMahon Background22

Eugene and Julia McMahon opened a series of accounts with the brokerage
firm of Shearson/American Express Inc. (Shearson) between 1980 and 1982.

12. See, e.g., Allagaert v. Perot, 548 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 910
(1977); Greater Continental Corp. v. Schechter, 422 F.2d 1100 (2d Cir. 1970).
13. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1988). Section 12 is an anti-fraud provision of the Securities Act.
15. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 431, 434-35.
16. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988). Section 10(b) is an anti-fraud provision of the Exchange Act.
17. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1989).
18. Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 248 n.6 (1987) (Blackmun,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
19. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v.
Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985). Justice White claims in dictum that the continued extension of Wilko

to §10(b) claims "is a matter of substantial doubt." Id. at 224.
20, See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 249 n.8 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part).
21. Id. at 225.
22. The McMahon case has been extensively reviewed elsewhere, so an exhaustive analysis
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Two of the customer account agreements signed by Julia provided that any

controversy arising out of these accounts would be submitted to arbitration.?
In 1984, the McMahons brought suit against Shearson and Mary Ann
McNulty, their registered representative at Shearson, in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York.? The complaint alleged
that McNulty, with the knowledge of Shearson, had churned their accounts,

withheld material information, and made false statements in violation of
section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and SEC Rule lOb-5. 2 The complaint also
stated a claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO),2 and state law claims for fraud and breach of fiduciary duties. 27
Shearson moved to compel arbitration of the claims under section 3 of the
Federal Arbitration Act of 1924 (Arbitration Act)? based on the arbitration
clauses in the customer account agreements. The district court granted the

motion to compel arbitration on all the issues except the RICO claim. 29 The
district court relied upon the strong national policy of enforcing existing

arbitration agreements-a policy embodied in the Arbitration Act-in compelling the McMahons to submit to arbitration. 0 The Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, however, applied the Wilko doctrine and refused to

compel the arbitration of the 10(b) claims. 3' The court of appeals also upheld

the district court's ruling that the RICO claims were non-arbitrable.3 2 The

McMahons' victory, however, was short-lived.

will not be attempted in this Note. See generally Bedell, Harrison & Harvey, The McMahon
Mandate: Compulsory Arbitration of Securities and RICO Claims, 19 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 1
(1987); Hood, Arbitration and Litigation of Public Customers' Claims Against Broker-Dealers
after McMahon, 19 ST. MARY's L.J. 541 (1988); Klein & Harkins, Significance for Investors and
the SEC, 20 REv. SEC. & CommoDTmIs REG. 195 (1987); Selig & Dinkoff, Arbitration of Securities
and Futures Disputes, 20 Rav. SEC. & COMMODiEs REG. 189 (1987); Note, Who's Protecting
the Investors? Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987), Compels Private
Claims Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act into Arbitration, 19 Asuz. ST. L.J.
793 (1987); Note, Leading Cases, 101 HARv. L. Ray. 119, 280 (1987); Note, Enforceability of
Predispute Arbitration Agreements Under the Federal Securities Laws: Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 8 PACE L. REv. 193 (1988); Note, Securities-Arbitration-Predlspute
Arbitration Agreements Enforceable Against Investors Filing Claims Under Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 19 ST. MARY'S L.J. 753 (1988).
23. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 222-23. The arbitration agreement provided in part: "Unless
unenforceable due to federal or state law, any controversy arising out of or relating to my
accounts, to transactions with you for me or to this agreement or the breach thereof, shall be
settled by arbitration. .. ." Id. at 223.
24. Id.
25. Id.; see also supra notes 16-17.
26. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988).
27. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 223.
28. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1988).
29. McMahon v. Shearson/American Express Inc., 618 F. Supp. 384, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
30. Id. at 389.
31. McMahon v. Shearson/American Express Inc., 788 F.2d 94, 96 (2d Cir. 1986).
32. Id. at 98-99.
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C. McMahon in the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the court of appeals in a
5-4 decision on June 8, 1987, holding that both the section 10(b) and the
RICO claims were arbitrable. 3 Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor
first insisted that the Arbitration Act should provide the starting point for
the analysis, and went on to state that the Act "mandates enforcement of
agreements to arbitrate statutory claims," absent fraud or an explicit congressional ban on waivers of federal court standingY3
The McMahons had argued that section 29(a) of the Exchange Act forbids
the waiver of the section 27 jurisdictional provision reserving the federal
courts' exclusive jurisdiction over Exchange Act claims. The Court rejected
this argument, stressing that section 29(a) precludes only waivers regarding
compliance with substantive obligations of the Exchange Act. Section 27 does
not impose any substantive duties; therefore, reasoned the Court, section 27's
35
grant of jurisdiction may be waived.
Without explicitly addressing or overruling Wilko's application to the
Securities Act, the majority then asserted that Wilko did not extend to
Exchange Act claims. 36 In reaching this conclusion, the majority limited Wilko
by reading it narrowly. The McMahon Court reinterpreted Wilko as holding
that a waiver of judicial forum was unenforceable only because of the
perceived inadequacy of arbitration to enforce rights under the Securities Act
in 1953, when Wilko was decided. 37
The Court went on to reject the McMahons' argument that pre-dispute
agreements are void under section 29(a) because they result from broker
overreaching and inequality of bargaining power. The Court claimed that
"[t]he voluntariness of the agreement is irrelevant to this inquiry . ...1,,3
The Court made this claim even while conceding that if a broker maneuvered
a customer into an agreement, it would be grounds for revocation of the
contract under ordinary principles of contract law, 39 which embody the
standard for revocation under section 2 of the Arbitration Act. 40 The Court's
33. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 220. Since a unanimous court agreed that the McMahons' RICO

claim was subject to arbitration, this Note will not address that issue further.
34. Id. at 226.
35. Id. at 227.
36. Id. at 228-29.

37. Id.
38. Id. at 230.
39. Id. at 230-31.

40. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). This section states:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising
out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole of any
part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing
controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract.

702
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refusal to consider coercion by brokers also seems at odds with the Court's

earlier assertion that a well-founded claim of fraud or excessive 4 economic
power would result in the revocation of an arbitration agreement. '
Finally, the majority rejected the McMahons' argument that the conference
report regarding the 1975 amendments to the Exchange Act ratified the
federal courts' extension of Wilko to Exchange Act claims, even though "[ilt

was the clear understanding of the conferees that this amendment did not
change existing law, as articulated in Wilko v. Swan ...."42 The Court
rejected any argument that congressional inaction could equal endorsement
of the extension of Wilko to Exchange Act claims. The Court assumed that
because Congress failed to change existing law, the Wilko issue was left to

the courts. 43 This is a surprising instance of judicial activism from the Court's
new conservative majority.
The Court's key argument was that the competence of the arbitral tribunals
is now much higher than it was in 1953. 44 The Court is further supported by
the virtual plenary authority of the SEC to oversee and regulate arbitration
proceedings,45 even though "judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards necessarily
is limited."46 The Court's faith in the competence of the arbitral tribunals,
however, does not appear to be supported by any evidence other than Justice

O'Connor's gut feeling "that there is no reason to assume ...that arbitrators
will not follow the law."

47

Nor does the Court's faith in the SEC's oversight

41. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226.
42. Id. at 236-37 (quoting H.R. CorN. REP. No. 229, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. I11, reprintedin
1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AiN. NEws 179, 342).
43. Id.at 238.
44. Id.at 233-34.
45, Id.

46. Id.at 232; see also 9 U.S.C. § 10. This section gives the standard for vacation of
arbitration awards as follows:
In either of the following cases the United States court in and for the district
wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the
application of any party to the arbitration(a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either
of them.
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and
material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of
any party have been prejudiced.
(d)Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them
that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was
not made.
(e)Where an award is vacated and the time within the agreement required the
award to be made has not expired the court may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing
by the arbitrators.
Id.
47. Id.
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capacity seem to reflect the reality of that agency's current role in the
market.48
Justice Blackmun, in a vigorous dissent, rejected the majority's conclusion
that the Exchange Act claim was arbitrable. 49 He first reasoned that the
legislative history of the 1975 amendments to the Exchange Act imply a
congressional intent to allow the trend of extending Wilko to section 10(b)
claims.50 Justice Blackmun then interpreted the Wilko decision as an affirmation of the policies inherent in the Securities Act, especially the goal of
investor protection, rather than as a limited attack on arbitration's perceived
inadequacy for the pursuit of section 12(2) claims in 1953 .1 Justice Blackmun

focused on similar policy concerns evident in the Exchange Act, finding that
both acts "have the same basic goal ' 5 2 and merit the same generous application of Wilko.
Beyond criticizing the Court's institutional competence to eviscerate Wilko,
Justice Blackmun further expressed doubt that arbitration, even assuming
improvement since 1953, provides a substantively adequate forum for the
protection of investor rights. 3 Specifically, the apparent impossibility of
judicial review, given the standards of the Arbitration Act, 4 the lack of a
record, and the failure to mandate written awards were issues that troubled
Justice Blackmun1 5 He also noted a danger in putting investors into an
arbitral arena largely controlled by the very industry with which they are in
56
dispute.
Finally, Justice Blackmun saw a pretense in the majority's reliance on the
oversight authority of the SEC. He realized that SEC review powers are, in
practice, virtually non-existent.57 Overall, he viewed the majority's result as
an abandonment of the individual investor by the judiciary at a time when
58
judicial protection was sorely needed.
Justice Stevens, in a single page, also dissented from the portion of the
Court's judgment on the arbitrability of the Exchange Act claims. Like Justice
Blackmun, he relied on an institutional analysis, arguing that the Court had
59
overstepped its proper judicial role and, in effect, acted as a quasi-legislature.

48. See infra text accompanying note 57.
49. Justices Brennan and Marshall joined Justice Blackmun's opinion.
50. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 247 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
51. Id.at 251-52.
52. Id.at 256. For an excellent discussion of the legislative history, policies, scope, goals and
great reforms of the federal securities acts, see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
53. Id.at 257.
54. Id.at 257-58; see also supra note 46.
55. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 259.
56. Id.at 260.
57. Id.at 265-66.
58. See supra text accompanying note 5.
59. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 268 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

INDIANA LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:697

Justice Stevens argued that the longstanding history of the Wilko doctrine
should be modified, if at all, by the legislature. 0
D.

The Small Step to Rodriguez

After the McMahon decision, brokerage customers with grievances continued to attempt to circumvent arbitration. Since McMahon had not explicitly
overruled Wilko, investors would bring their cases in federal court under the
only avenue left open to them: section 12 of the Securities Act. 61 It was only
a matter of time before the Supreme Court would move to block this path
by invalidating Wilko completely.
On May 15, 1989, a 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court, in Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,62 decided that Securities Act
claims were subject to arbitration in the same way as the Exchange Act claims
in McMahon. This holding finally overruled Wilko. The petitioners were a
group of unsophisticated investors in Brownsville, Texas, who lost over
$400,000 they had invested at the local Shearson office. The investors had
signed arbitration agreements with Shearson. However, they eventually sued
Shearson in federal court, alleging that their money was lost due to unauthorized and fraudulent trades made by their broker. 63
The court of appeals reversed a district court order to submit all claims to
4
arbitration except for those raised under section 12(2) of the Securities Act.
Noting that the district court had relied on Wilko, the court of appeals
reversed and ordered the parties to submit all claims to arbitration. 5 The
court of appeals reasoned that the Supreme Court's subsequent rulings have
reduced Wilko to "obsolescence."66
In affirming the court of appeals, the Supreme Court agreed completely
with the appellate court's assessment of Wilko (although the justices took
the court of appeals to the woodshed for not following existing precedent).6
"We now conclude that Wilko was incorrectly decided and is inconsistent
with the prevailing uniform construction of other federal statutes governing
arbitration agreements in the setting of business transactions."' '

60. Id.
61. See supra note 14.
62. 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989).
63. Id. at 1918-19.
64. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Lehnan Bros., Inc., 845 F.2d 1296, 1299 (5th Cir.
1988), aff'd sub nom. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 1917
(1989).

65. Id.
66. Id. at 1299.
67. Rodriguez, 109 S. Ct. at 1921-22.
68. Id. at 1922.
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Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy interpreted the Wilko Court's
deference to the Securities Act and its policy of investor protection as simply
a case of judicial hostility to arbitration.
That view has been steadily eroded over the years, beginning in the lower
courts. The erosion intensified in our most recent decisions upholding
agreements to arbitrate federal claims raised under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 ....

To the extent that Wilko rested on suspicion of

arbitration as a method of weakening the protections afforded in the
substantive law to would-be complainants, it has fallen far out of step
with our current strong endorsement of the federal statutes favoring this
method of resolving disputes.0
To the Rodriguez majority, the policies behind the Arbitration Act, a less
significant piece of legislation both in terms of size and scope than the
landmark securities statutes, apparently outweighed any other policy considerations.
Justice Kennedy went on to compare the anti-waiver provisions of the
Securities Act with the anti-waiver provisions of the Exchange Act. He found
that section 29(a) of the Exchange Act 0 is almost identical to section 14 of
the Securities Act. 7' The Court in McMahon had refused to read section 29(a)
as prohibiting enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements. Given the
similarity of the statutes, the Rodriguez Court refused to prohibit them under
the Securities Act. 72
The majority then reiterated Justice O'Connor's argument from McMahon
that investors should have faith in the plenary powers of the SEC: 73
And in McMahon we explained at length why we rejected the Wilko
Court's aversion to arbitration as a forum for resolving disputes over
securities transactions, especially in light of the relatively recent expansion
of the Securities and Exchange Commission's authority to oversee and to
regulate those arbitration procedures. We need not repeat those arguments
here. 74
This refusal to address the practical reality of the SEC's extremely limited
oversight power completely ignored Justice Blackmun's concerns in McMahon,
75
and the realities of the current environment.
Concluding his analysis, Justice Kennedy cited the strong language of the
Arbitration Act and argued that Wilko and McMahon are incompatible as a
matter of securities law: 76

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 1920 (citing Scherk, 417 U.S. at 506; and McMahon, 482 U.S. at 220).
15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a).
15 U.S.C. § 77n.
Rodriguez, 109 S. Ct. at 1921.
See supra text accompanying note 45.
Rodriguez, 109 S. Ct. at 1921 (citations omitted).
See supra text accompanying note 57; see also infra notes 135-39 and accompanying text.
Rodriguez, 109 S. Ct. at 1921-22.
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It also would be undesirable for the decisions in Wilko and McMahon to
continue to exist side by side. Their inconsistency is at odds with the
principle that the 1933 and 1934 Acts should be construed harmoniously
because they "constitute interrelated components of the federal regulatory
scheme governing transactions in securities."
The Supreme Court then overruled Wilko and affirmed the judgment of the
court of appeals .8
In a caustic dissent, Justice Stevens asserted that "when our earlier opinion
gives a statutory provision concrete meaning, which Congress elects not to
amend during the ensuing 3 1/2 decades, our duty to respect Congress' work
product is strikingly similar to the duty of other federal courts to respect our
work product." 79 This is a more forceful version of the argument he put
forth in McMahon. In an angry swipe at the "conservative" members of the
majority, he added that "[j]udges who have confidence in their own ability
to fashion public policy are less hesitant to change the law than those of us
who are inclined to give wide latitude to the views of the voters' representatives
on non-constitutional matters."0
However, none of this vituperative language had any effect on the final
result in the case. The Supreme Court, in what may be seen as a blatant
attempt to reduce the federal docket, has made itself undeniably clear: Wilko
is dead and arbitration is king. The Supreme Court appeared unwilling to
completely pull its finger out of the litigation dike in the McMahon case,
perhaps because it did not want to project the image of a judiciary willing
to abandon the individual investor and the policies of the securities statutes
with one bold stroke. However, by stretching the process out over two
different cases, the Supreme Court has accomplished a drop by drop erosion
of these policies as complete as that caused by a flash flood.
II.

WHERE RODRIGUEI LEAVES INVESTORS

The decision in Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,81
following the earlier reasoning in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon,n2 mandates the enforcement of valid pre-dispute arbitration agreements for claims arising under any of the -securities regulations. The broad
pronouncements in the Rodriguez and McMahon decisions have ushered in
a new era that favors arbitration in securities disputes. This Note will now
examine what the arbitration process has in store for individual investors.

77. Id. at 1922 (citations omitted).
78. Id.

79. Id.at 1923 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
80. Id.

81. 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989).
82. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
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A.

The Advantages of Arbitration

Some commentators feel that the arbitral forum is fully competent to
protect the policies at the heart of the federal securities laws.8 3 These commentators posit the vast experience of the arbitrators, the percentages of
awards given to customers in arbitration and the extensive use of arbitration
in other countries as proof of the fairness and efficiency of the arbitration
process.84
Other commentators feel that investors will be helped procedurally by the
less formal nature of the arbitration proceedings.85 Specifically, investors who
typically have been dismissed from court for failing to properly state a claim
86
may benefit from the relaxed pleading requirements in the arbitral forum.
Similarly, the absence of discovery could theoretically be an advantage to the
customer8 7 Also, since arbitrators are not bound by the rules of evidence,
investors may be able to introduce hearsay evidence of conversations with
their brokers,"8 although this could prove to be a double-edged sword.
Recently, the New York Stock Exchange commissioned the accounting firm
of Deloitte Haskins & Sells to perform a survey regarding customer-originated
claims that were terminated by arbitration, litigation or settlement.8 9 The
survey used cases terminated during the most recent three month periods for
which the firm could obtain data.9 These periods ranged from October 1,
1987, to June 30, 1988.91
The survey shows that arbitration has a distinct advantage for investors in
both speed and size of awards. For example, the average elapsed time to the
termination of a case through litigation was 599 days; whereas, the average
elapsed time for cases referred to arbitration was 434 days. 2 For cases that
began as litigation and were subsequently transferred to arbitration, the
average elapsed time shot up to 1,056 days. 93 While this data does show a
pronounced difference, one would expect arbitration, for all its supposed
"speed," to be even faster.

83. Bedell, Harrison & Harvey, supra note 22, at 8.
84. Id. at 8-10.
85. See, e.g., Hood, supra note 22, at 584.
86. Id. at 579-81.
87. Id. at 584. However, Professor Hood struggles with a hypothetical for this point, and it
is unclear what he has in mind.
88. Id. at 584-85.
89. See ApPN~nix, data accumulated from letter from Deloitte Haskins & Sells to the New
York Stock Exchange (undated) (copy on file at the Indiana Law Journal). The accounting firm
of Deloitte Haskins & Sells recently merged with the accounting firm of Touche Ross to become
Deloitte & Touche.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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The size of the awards as a percentage of the original claim in cases
resolved through arbitration was 19.57% versus a minimal 2.60% for litigation. 94 When the cases transferred from litigation to arbitration are factored
in, the payments as a percentage of the original claim for all of the arbitrated
cases falls to 14.81%. 9S However, the difference between arbitration and
litigation might well be due to a tendency to bid up a claim when entering
litigation, as opposed to a possibly more realistic approach when entering
arbitration. The legal costs of arbitration to the brokerage firms were also
significantly lower as a percentage of the payments than the legal costs of
litigation. 91 Obviously, this is one of the main attractions arbitration agreements have for the industry.
Although this survey does not show how many of the claims were successful
in either litigation or arbitration, other surveys tend to show that a majority
of arbitrated cases result in awards for the customers. 97 Also, data suggests
that the SEC has received few complaints regarding arbitration.98
Although the Deloitte survey does have its limitations, it seems to endorse
the cost-effectiveness of the arbitration procedure for both the brokerage firm
and the customer. The arbitration process appears to be both competent to
protect the goals of the securities laws and cost-efficient in providing a
cheaper, quicker alternative dispute forum. While this Note ultimately argues
that arbitration is flawed in its present form, its real advantages to the
customer and industry cannot be denied.
B.

Recent Arbitration Rule Changes Beneficial to Investors

In 1977, the SEC invited the establishment of the Securities Industry
Conference on Arbitration (SICA) to serve as an advisory body.9 The SICA,
after reviewing then-existing arbitration procedures as an alternative dispute
resolution forum, developed the Uniform Code of Arbitration.' The selfregulatory organizations (SROs), which perform the actual arbitrations, have
modeled their own arbitration codes after this Uniform Code. 0' This Note
will use the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) Code of
Arbitration Procedure (CAP) (1989) as a model of the rules governing

94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.

97. See Bedell, Harrison & Harvey, supra note 22, at 9 n.57.
98. See SIA Response Letter, supra note 2, at 5.
99. Self-Regulatory Organizations; Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes by the New
York Stock Exchange, Inc., National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., and the American
Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to the Arbitration Process and the Use of Predispute Arbitration
Clauses, 54 Fed. Reg. 21,144, 21,145 (1989) [hereinafter "SEC Order"].
100. Id.
101. Id.

SECURITIES ARBITRATION

1990]

arbitration in the securities industry. 102 The NASD is the only national SRO,
and its CAP closely tracks the Uniform Code.
On September 10, 1987, the SEC sent SICA a letter expressing concerns
with the present industry-sponsored arbitration. °3 In response to these concerns, the SROs filed proposals to amend the arbitration rules. The SEC
approved the proposals on May 10, 1989.104
The SROs' amendments affect many different areas of the rules including,
among others, service of pleadings, appointment of replacement arbitrators
on a panel, availability of small claims procedures, the number of arbitrators
required to hear a claim, and arbitration fees. 105 This Note will focus on the
rule changes affecting discovery, the classification of arbitrators, the preservation of a record, the content and availability of arbitration awards, and
predispute arbitration clauses.
1.

Discovery

The arbitration rules had required parties to exchange documents informally
and voluntarily. However, parties would sometimes refuse to turn over
documents they felt were privileged. Sanctions for parties resisting production
were inadequate to assure compliance with the rules.
Under the amendments to CAP section 32, information requests must either
be satisfied or objected to within thirty calendar days from the date of
service."' 6 The party who made the request has ten days to respond to an
objection. 1 7 A party whose information request has not been satisfied may
refer the matter to a pre-hearing conference."'3 If the pre-hearing conference
is unable to resolve the issues, the CAP provides for the appointment of a
single public arbitrator to issue subpoenas, direct appearances of witnesses,
require the production of documents, compel depositions, and set deadlines
to expedite the hearing."'"
The SEC believes "that the SRO discovery rule proposals should increase
the efficiency of arbitration proceedings and provide substantially greater
protections for public participants.""110 These rules should encourage compliance with discovery by industry parties who often have the only documents
relevant to the case. Individual investors thus derive a substantial benefit
from the new discovery rules.

102. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC., CODE OF ARBITRATION
(1989) [hereinafter 1989 CAP] (copy on file at the Indiana Law Journal).
103. SEC Order, supra note 99.

104. Id.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 21,145-55.
Id. at 21,149.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 21,150.
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Classification of Arbitrators

Although the 1988 CAP"' had required that a majority of each arbitration
panel be public arbitrators and a minority-be industry arbitrators, ' 2 in practice
this distinction tended to be hazy. The NASD recognized that often attorneys,
accountants and other professionals who practiced in the securities area or
worked closely with the securities industry were designated as non-securities
industry arbitrators." 3 This practice had led to public skepticism toward the
purported neutrality of the arbitration panels." 4 Given their close ties to the
industry, a panel made up of affiliated professionals might not achieve the
goal of neutrality that the drafters of the CAP obviously desired.
The SEC, while pleased with the mixed industry/public arbitration panel
theory, was also concerned with the classification of persons with clear
affiliations to the securities industry as non-industry arbitrators." ' Section 19
of the CAP has now been amended to include a definition of industry
arbitrator that includes professionals who provide services to securities industry
clients; such as attorneys, accountants, and other professionals who devoted
twenty percent or more of their work effort to industry clients within the
last two years. 16 Additionally, anyone who worked in one of the "traditional"
industry positions within the last three years would be classified as an industry
arbitrator." 7 The arbitrators will also be required to disclose their employment
histories for the past ten years, as well as any ties or conflicts of interest
8
between the arbitrator and the parties."
The new classifications and disclosure requirements should refute any
appearance that the panel is packed with industry personnel against the public
investors. The SEC says that "[t]he changes proposed regarding the classification of arbitrators are very significant to the continued success of SRO
arbitration."" 9 These changes should rekindle investor faith in the neutrality
of the arbitration process.
3.

Preservation of a Record

Section 37 of the CAP addresses the preservation of a record of arbitration
proceedings. Historically, a record would not be kept unless one of the parties

Ill. NATIONAL AssociATIoN OF SEcuRITIEs DEALERS, INC., CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE
(1988) [hereinafter 1988 CAP] (copy on file at the IndianaLaw Journal).
112. Id. § 19.
113. Telephone interview with Timothy Scott, Arbitration Counsel at the NASD office in
Chicago (Jan. 5, 1989) [hereinafter "Scott"]. The Chicago office is one of four NASD offices
in the country that administrates the arbitration proceedings.
114. SEC Order, supra note 99, at 21,146.
115. Id.
116. 1989 CAP, supra note 102, § 19.
117. SEC Order, supra note 99, at 21,146.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 21,147.
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requested a recording. Further, the party making the request had to bear the
cost of transcription.'2 Unless a customer was aware of the provision and
able to afford the cost, the record for a possible appeal would be lost. The
NASD found that most of the arbitrations went unrecorded.' 2' Therefore,
most of the customers would be precluded from asserting any of the grounds
necessary for vacation of the award under the Arbitration Act.'"
The SEC requested that the SROs amend their rules to assure that records
of arbitration proceedings are made and preserved. "These records are
necessary for courts to use in conjunction with any review of the proceedings
they may make."'' 2
Section 37 codifies this requirement. A verbatim record will be kept by
either a stenographic reporter or a tape recording. If a party wants to have
the record transcribed, the cost will be borne by that party, unless the
arbitrators direct otherwise. 2 4 This amendment will adequately ensure the
preservation of a record for appeal. Tape recordings are inexpensive, and it
is only fair that the party requesting a transcript bear the expense.
4.

Content and Public Availability of Award Decisions

The format of award decisions is dealt with in Section 41 of the CAP.
Old section 41(a) of the CAP said, "All awards shall be in writing and signed
by a majority of the arbitrators or in such manner as is required by applicable
law." 12 These awards often took the form of a dollar value for the customer
if she won, or else judgment for the brokerage firm. The awards almost
never gave any opinion or holding on the legal theory or factual determination
that formed the basis of the award. Many of the monetary awards were not
even remotely related to the amount set out as a claim in the pleadings.'12
Without an opinion, investors-had no idea how the arbitration panel arrived
at the figure in the award, and thus had no basis upon which to claim fraud
or any of the other predicates for vacation of the award.
Section 41 of the CAP has now been amended to provide that awards
shall contain the names of the parties, the damages or relief requested, a
summary of the issues in controversy, the damages or relief awarded, a
statement of any other issues resolved, the names of the arbitrators and the
signatures of the arbitrators concurring in the award. 27

120. 1988 CAP, supra note 111, § 37.
121. Scott, supra n.113.
122. See supra note 46 (quoting the text of § 10 of the Arbitration Act which gives the
standards for vacation of arbitration awards).
123. SEC Order, supra note 99, at 21,151.
124. Id.
125. 1988 CAP, supra note 111, § 41(a).
126. Scott, supra note 113.
127. SEC Order, supra note 99, at 21,151.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:697

5. Predispute Arbitration Clauses
The SEC had been concerned about the use of mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration clauses in customer account agreements. 128 Many investors would
not know they were entering an arbitration agreement when they signed a
new customer account form.
The SROs developed a rule change designed to improve disclosure to
customers opening accounts, and to restrict the content of the arbitration
clauses. 29 The change requires that brokers place a notice immediately before
the clause. The notice language must inform customers that they are waiving
their right to seek remedies in court, that arbitration is final, that discovery
is more limited, that the award is not required to contain factual findings or
legal reasoning and that a minority of the arbitrators may be from the
securities industry.130
The new rule requires that this language be highlighted in four ways. First,
large or distinguishable type must be used. Second, the disclosure language
must be in outline form and noticeable to the readers. Third, a highlighted
statement reiterating that the agreement contains an arbitration clause and
stating where that clause is located must be included immediately preceding
the signature line. Finally, the broker-dealer must give a copy of the agreement, including the arbitration clause, to the customer, who is required to
acknowledge receipt of the agreement by signature.'
This rule change is a tremendous step forward from the practice of hiding
the arbitration clause on the back of a customer agreement that the customers
often did not read. The disclosure will heighten investor awareness of some
of the strengths and weaknesses in the arbitration process. The disclosure
32
also helps satisfy an important policy inherent in the securities statutes.
Nevertheless, a number of concerns with the fairness and efficacy of the
arbitral forum remain that were either unresolved by the recent rule changes
or not addressed by the SEC. The next section of this Note will explore these
remaining problem areas.
III.

REMAniNG PROBLEM AREAS

As noted above, arbitration is not without its drawbacks. These concerns
include the lack of evidentiary standards, the lack of effective review by the

128. Id. at 21,153 n.51.
129. Id. A second rule change restricting the content of the arbitration clauses merely prohibits

agreements that limit or contradict the rules of any SRO or limit the ability of a party to file
an arbitration claim. Id. at 21,154.
130. Id. at 21,153.
131. Id.
132. For an excellent discussion of the disclosure policy, see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185 (1976).
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SEC, the unavailability of appellate avenues after arbitration, the possible
rise of "arbitrator shopping," the lack of written opinions, the absence of
articulable standards of law to be applied in arbitration and the practice of
requiring arbitration agreements as a condition of doing business with the
brokerage firm.
A.

Evidentiary Standards

The arbitration system has many procedural rules that are completely
different from the rules of procedure that would govern the claims in
litigation. Section 34 of the CAP delineates the evidentiary standards that
govern arbitrations. It states in full: "The arbitrators shall determine the
materiality and relevance of any evidence proffered and shall not be bound
by rules governing the admissibility of evidence."' 33 This completely discretionary standard can be applied in a different manner in every case. The
NASD itself recognizes that the rules of evidence are not clear and are applied
in a haphazard fashion.' M
B.

SEC Review

The SEC conducts no review of the efficacy or correctness of arbitrations
administered by the SROs or the American Arbitration Association. The SEC
can only approve the procedure used in the arbitrations; 3 5 therefore, it has
no authority to examine how the substantive law is applied in the arbitrations.
Justice Blackmun observed in McMahon that the SEC "does not contend
that its 'sweeping authority,' .

.

. includes a review of specific arbitration

proceedings."' 36 He further doubted "whether the Commission could undertake to conduct any such review."' 3 7 Upon examination of the SEC's oversight
powers in practice, the Court's reliance in McMahon on the "expansive power
to ensure the adequacy of the arbitration procedures ' 13 is without support,
and the Rodriguez majority's refusal to address this issue is unjustifiable. 3 9
C. Appellate Avenues Available After Arbitration
Persuading a court to overturn an arbitration award is very difficult. The
standard adopted in the Arbitration Act for the vacation of an arbitration

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

1989 CAP, supra note 102, § 34. This section was not changed by the 1989 amendments.
Scott, supra note 113.
Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 234 (1987).
Id. at 265 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted).
Id.
Id. at 233.
See supra text accompanying notes 73-75.
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award is extremely strict. 140 The courts normally will not inquire into the
substantive basis for .the determination of the award. Rather, the courts
require a showing of fraud, corruption or similar abuses articulated in
4
section 10 of the Arbitration Act.' '
The Supreme Court has developed the "manifest disregard" of the law
standard as grounds for the vacation of an arbitration award. 42 Professor
Lipton points out, however, that this standard has not required arbitrators
to comply with the law, but rather to "base their awards on whatever grounds
they choose as long as the result is not obviously in conflict with the outcome
that would be required by law.' 1 43 In reality, however, the federal courts do
not impose even this minimal standard. The courts only require that arbitrators
pay "lip service" to the applicable law. 44
D.

ArbitratorShopping

Brokers will now keep statistics on the performance of the different arbitral
tribunals and the different individual arbitrators. Brokers will structure their
arbitration clauses to mandate the forum that is most sympathetic to the
industry and exclude arbitrators who have an anti-industry history. This
"arbitrator shopping" would favor the brokers over the customers and should
not be encouraged.
Arbitrator shopping is more dangerous than any forum shopping that can
occur in the federal court system. 45 Unlike judicial opinions, arbitration
records and awards are not published, and are not, therefore, available for
public inspection. The brokers will be the only parties with thorough information on the arbitrators, and they will utilize their informational advantage
to the disadvantage of the investors.
E.

Lack of Written Opinions

Significantly, the new section 41 of the CAP does not require written
opinions. The SEC concluded that:
After careful consideration of whether awards ought to include reasons
for arbitrators' awards, as is advocated by Public Citizen and [the Plaintiff
Employment Lawyers Association] in their comment letters, we have

140. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1988) (reproduced supra note 46).
141. Id.
142. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953).

143. Lipton, The Standard on Which Arbitrators Base Their Decisions: The SROs Must
Decide, 16 SEc. REG. L.J. 3, 8 (1988); see also notes 147-54 and accompanying text.
144. Id. at 10.
145. Even if a contractual choice of court is enforced, the parties would still have no power
to select which judge within the district would hear their case.
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concluded that it would not be appropriate at this time to require the
inclusion of written opinions in awards.
This rule change already represents a significant movement in the
explication of the arbitral process. We believe that it would be in the
public interest to allow the SROs and parties a period of time to adjust
to this rule, and to await any independent development6 on the part of
the arbitrators themselves to develop written opinions.'

This position places a great deal of faith and hope in the initiative of the
arbitrators.
Arbitrators are unlikely to make themselves targets for the courts by
independently writing opinions. A mere record of the proceeding is not
enough for an appellate court to apply the "manifest disregard" standard
necessary to overturn an arbitration award. Requiring written opinions would
eliminate emotionally-driven equitable awards, and would also show what
standard of law the panel applied in reaching its decision. A written opinion
is necessary to appeal an award. The SEC should have required written
opinions, and the passive position it has adopted is a flaw in the otherwise
commendable rule changes.
F.

Standard of Law

One of the most glaring weaknesses of the arbitration procedure is the
failure to specify the standard of law on which the arbitrators must base
their decisions. The CAP is completely silent on this matter. Section 35 allows
the arbitrators complete discretion when interpreting the Code, but does not
make any reference to the substantive law. 47 Generally, the NASD tries to
select arbitrators who have some familiarity with the securities statutes, but
no testing procedure is administered.141 No mandatory direction as to what
standards of law govern arbitrations is given, and only recently did the NASD
begin a brief orientation program that attempts to introduce new arbitrators
149
to the substantive law that underlies these disputes.
In addition, the CAP does not require that the arbitrators be attorneys.
The CAP does require that a majority of each arbitration panel not be from
the securities industry. 50 Those from within the securities industry, such as
brokers or managers, can apply any standard they desire to these disputes.
They might apply what they perceive in their experience to be the applicable
law, but they might well be wrong. They may apply what they feel is common
industry practice, but this practice might not conform with the applicable
securities laws. An industry arbitrator might decide that the broker in the

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

SEC Order, supra note 99, at 21,151.
1989 CAP, supra note 102, § 35. This section was not changed by the 1989 amendments.
Scott, supra note 113.
Id.
1989 CAP, supra note 102, § 19.
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dispute did not follow the procedure used by that arbitrator's firm and rule
against the broker even though the broker was complying with the law. The
outsiders on the arbitration panel, especially if not trained in the securities
laws, might apply the law, or their own sense of business judgment, or basic
notions of fairness. As Professor Lipton observes, "there is no clear answer
15
regarding the impact the law should have on an arbitrator's decision.' '
The endless possibilities for different standards indicate that the relevant
law is not necessarily the basis for arbitration decisions. This lack of foundation in the law will have the greatest adverse effect on a complex claim
involving complicated applications of the securities laws and the RICO
52
statutes.1
For instance, suppose a broker 'was trading options utilizing a complex
butterfly-spread strategy for a customer's discretionary account. This broker's
firm had a floor trader at the options exchange who told the broker that he
could skim points on the opening and closing of the options if the broker
entered them as market orders. The broker and trader agreed to split the
profits. Somehow, the customer discovered this arrangement and wanted to
recover his money in an arbitration proceeding. In order to reach the correct
application of the law in this case, the arbitrators would have to apply the
securities statutes, the rules promulgated under the authority of the securities
statutes, SRO rules, exchange rules and the RICO statute. This would be a
difficult task even for a court experienced in securities law, much less a
broker, accountant or any other arbitrator thrown into the fray.
A decision rooted so precariously in the law could range from the correct
application of the law, to a compromise solution, to a result completely at
odds with the applicable law. Therefore, there does not seem to be any
justification for Justice O'Connor's assumption in the McMahon opinion that
arbitrators will correctly apply the law.Y3 There is also no reason to assume
that this arbitration procedure will preserve the policy of investor protection
underlying the federal securities statutes. ' 4
G.

Mandatory Arbitration Clauses

In the past, brokerage firms were so enamored with arbitration clauses
that they continued to utilize them even in the face of the Wilko decision
and its extension to the Exchange Act. However, under Wilko, firms required
arbitration agreements at their peril. An investor could always litigate the
validity of the agreement in federal court, and the firm would lose. After

151.
152.
153.
154.

Lipton, supra note 143, at 7.
Id. at 5.
MMahon, 482 U.S. at 232; see also supra text accompanying note 47.
See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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McMahon and Rodriguez, however, broker-dealers face no such danger, and
arbitration agreements are that much more attractive.
In 1988, the SEC conducted a study of sixty-five broker-dealer firms that
accounted for 90% of all customer trading accounts in the United States.
The survey examined their use of arbitration agreements in 1988. Thirtynine percent of all cash accounts, 96% of all margin accounts and 95% of
the options accounts were subject to mandatory predispute arbitration
clauses. Firms such as Merrill Lynch, PaineWebber, A.G. Edwards, Dean
Witter and Kidder Peabody, however, did not require such an agreement
15
in their basic cash accounts.
Given the result in Rodriguez, firms may now legitimately and completely
avoid the costs of litigation 5 6 and excessive jury awards by requiring customers
to enter arbitration agreements 100% of the time for all accounts. If an
individual investor subject to an arbitration agreement ever brought a claim
in federal court, the firm could escape the litigation through a simple summary
judgment motion. Thus, McMahon and Rodriguez will lead all firms pursuing
bottom line efficiency to mandate arbitration agreements as a condition of
doing business.
The SEC attempts to address this issue by arguing that:
[A]pproval of this rule, which does not include provisions mandating
customer choice with respect to the signing of arbitration clauses is
consistent with the Act. Under the circumstances presented, the Commission is reluctant to dictate the terms of a fully disclosed agreement between
a broker-dealer and a customer. Investors currently have access to basic
brokerage services without agreeing to pursue any future disputes through
arbitration, rather than through the courts. This is so because a number
of broker-dealers, including several large full-service broker-dealers in the
country, do not require the signing of account agreements for cash
accounts.

57

This line of reasoning may have been valid in 1988 -when the SEC conducted
its survey. But after Rodriguez, this argument does not stand up to scrutiny:
The firms will find a new attractiveness in mandatory arbitration agreements,
and the availability of court remedies will correspondingly diminish.
The nearly unanimous practice of requiring arbitration agreements in certain
types of trading accounts, 5 1 prior to the Supreme Court's complete endorsement of arbitration in Rodriguez, demonstrates the extent to which the
industry favors these clauses. Now that the Supreme Court has established
its policy through a quasi-legislative action, there is no longer any incentive
for brokerage firms to omit arbitration clauses from their customer agree-

155.
156.
157.
158.

SEC Order, supra note 99, at 21,153 n.51.
See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
SEC Order, supra note 99, at 21,154 (emphasis added).
See supra text accompanying note 153.
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ments, and the practice will continue to grow. Broker-dealers will not continue
to allow trading, even on a cash basis, without the protection of an arbitration
agreement.
The securities statutes of 1933 and 1934 took the industry out of a purely
competitive market situation by imposing regulations on customary brokerdealer behavior that favored the investor. Although some economists may
find fault with this, it was a policy decision well within the constitutional
competence of the Congress. 5 9
To further its own goals and desires, the Supreme Court has changed the
structure of the imperfect market Congress imposed upon the industry.
McMahon and Rodriguez open the door to mandatory arbitration as a
universal practice in the securities industry, which Congress never intended
to allow. This improper use of judicial power in the face of a congressionally
mandated market structure will create and, perpetuate an artificially vertical,
inelastic supply curve in the market for a court remedy.
The danger in moving toward industry-wide mandatory arbitration is greatest for margin and options account traders. Cash accounts traders typically
transact fairly simple buy and sell orders, and any disputes they might have
should be easily resolved. In fact, it is precisely this type of account and
transaction that would be best resolved in the arbitral forum. However,
margin and options traders often utilize complex trading strategies' 60 that may
not be easily understood in a court of law, much less in arbitration. The
SEC survey shows that these traders are almost always required to agree to
arbitration,' 6' and the decision in Rodriguez will make that a universal
practice.
While the SEC admits an existing market for court remedies in the cash
account context, the agency also "recognizes that investors do not have such
access with respect to margin and options accounts ..... ,62 The SEC puts
forth the slim hope that "competitive forces will result in some firms offering
margin or options accounts without [arbitration] agreements." 16 The Supreme
Court's move toward an inelastic supply curve in the market for a court
remedy will destroy competitive forces in this market. Brokers will not reverse
their established practice with options and margin accounts to allow investors
to choose the dispute resolution forum. Rather, they will expand the practice
of mandating arbitration agreements.
The danger to margin and options account investors will be significant
even before mandatory arbitration becomes universal. Investors in today's

159. The U.S. Constitution explicitly grants to Congress the power "[t]o regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States .... " U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, c. 3. The
commerce power under article I is not shared with the judiciary under article III.
160. For an example of such a complex strategy, see supra text accompanying note 153.
161. See supra text accompanying note 155.
162. SEC Order, supra note 99, at 21,154.
163. Id.
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imperfect market are unlikely to know about the few firms that allow a court

remedy in the margin and options account context. They are just as unlikely
to know the real advantages and disadvantages of arbitration. Investor

ignorance has already produced a dangerously inelastic supply curve that will
only worsen as the broker-dealers begin responding to the McMahon and
Rodriguez decisions.
The SRO rule changes regarding predispute arbitration agreements are a

tremendous improvement in arbitration generally. 164 For example, the formal
notice requirements constitute a marked advance. However, an investor is
not benefited by notice regarding the limitations on arbitration if she is
effectively powerless to avoid an arbitration clause. Thus, there is an unfortunate and very serious limitation built into the CAP amendments. By failing
to prohibit brokers from requiring arbitration agreements as a mandatory
condition for doing business, the SEC has effectively rendered the rule changes
impotent to achieve meaningful investor protection.
At least one state attempt to regulate the practice of mandating arbitration
agreements as a condition of doing business' 6 was held unconstitutional under
164. See supra text accompanying notes 129-32.
165. MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 950, § 12.204(G) (held unconstitutional by Securities Indus. Ass'n
v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114 (Ist Cir. 1989)). The administrative regulation provided:
Dishonest or unethical practices in the securities business.
Broker-dealers. Each broker-dealer shall observe high standards of commercial honor and just
and equitable principles of trade in the conduct of its business. Act and practices, including but
not limited to the following, are considered contrary to such standards and constitute dishonest
or unethical practices which are grounds for denial, suspension or revocation of registration or
such other action authorized by law:
a. Requiring on or after January 1, 1989, that a customer located in Massachusetts,
other than a customer that is an institutional investor or financial institution
specified in 950 CMR 14.401(e), execute either a mandatory pre-dispute arbitration contract or a customer agreement containing a mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration clause that is a non-negotiable precondition to effecting transactions
in securities for the account of the customer or opening a securities cash account
or margin account by the customer with such broker-dealer;
b. Requesting on or after January 1, 1989, that a customer located in Massachusetts
execute either a mandatory pre-dispute arbitration contract or a customer account
agreement containing a pre-dispute arbitration clause where the contract or
agreement fails to conspiciously disclose that the execution of the contract or
agreement cannot be made a non-negotiable precondition to the opening by the
customer of a securities account with the broker-dealer;
c. Requesting on or after January 1, 1989, that a customer located in Massachusetts
execute either a mandatory pre-dispute arbitration contract or a customer account
agreement containing a pre-dispute arbitration clause without fully disclosing to
the customer in writing the legal effect of the pre-dispute arbitration contract
or clause;
d. Being found by a court of competent jurisdiction to have violated M.G.L. c.93A
in connection with the sale of securities; and
e. Being temporarily or permanently enjoined by any court of competent jurisdiction
from violating M.G.L. c.93A in connection with the sale of securities.
Id. (based on the CFTC regulations, infra note 167) (held unconstitutional in Securities Indus.
Ass'n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114, 1124 (1st Cir. 1989)).
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the supremacy clause.' 66 The federal judiciary has abandoned the investor to
the vagaries of the arbitral forum, leaving the SEC as the investor's sole

remaining guardian. The SEC should meet the responsibilities of this position
by following the example of the commodities and futures trading industry.
The Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) is the national selfregulatory organization for the commodities industry. It is similar to the
NASD within the securities industry. According to CFTC rules, signing an
arbitration agreement cannot be made a mandatory condition of doing

business with the broker-dealer.' 67
The SEC should duplicate the rules articulated by the CFTC, eliminating
the use of mandatory arbitration clauses as a condition of doing business
with the firm. There is no justification for treating commodities brokers as
inherently different than securities brokers, and the framework of the CFTC

rules is difficult to fault. The basic goal is disclosure of the options a customer
has when selecting a dispute resolution forum. This complies with the policies
at the heart of the federal securities laws: investor protection and disclosure.
Currently, if commodities firms want their customers to enter these agreements, their brokers have to sell these agreements along with the other services
they offer. Securities dealers should be made to sell the arbitration agreements

in the same fashion. Certainly the brokers can sell arbitration, with its
numerous benefits, if they can sell securities.

166. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114, 1124 (1st Cir. 1989).
167. 17 C.F.R. § 180.3 (1989). For instance, section 180.3(b)(6) reads:
(6) The agreement must include the following language printed in large boldface
type:
THREE FORUMS EXIST FOR THE RESOLUTION OF COMMODITY DISPUTES: CIVIL COURT LITIGATION, REPARATIONS AT THE COMMODITY
FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION (CFTC) AND ARBITRATION CONDUCTED BY A SELF-REGULATORY OR OTHER PRIVATE ORGANIZATION.
THE CFTC RECOGNIZES THAT THE OPPORTUNITY TO SETTLE DISPUTES BY ARBITRATION MAY IN SOME CASES PROVIDE MANY BENEFITS TO CUSTOMERS, INCLUDING THE ABILITY TO OBTAIN AN
EXPEDITIOUS AND FINAL RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES WITHOUT INCURRING SUBSTANTIAL COSTS. THE CFTC REQUIRES, HOWEVER, THAT
EACH CUSTOMER INDIVIDUALLY EXAMINE THE RELATIVE MERITS
OF ARBITRATION AND THAT YOUR CONSENT TO THIS ARBITRATION
AGREEMENT BE VOLUNTARY.
BY SIGNING THIS AGREEMENT, YOU: (1) MAY BE WAIVING YOUR
RIGHT TO SUE IN A COURT OF LAW; AND (2) ARE AGREEING TO BE
BOUND BY ARBITRATION OF ANY CLAIMS OR COUNTERCLAIMS WHICH
YOU OR [NAME] MAY SUBMIT TO ARBITRATION UNDER THIS AGREEMENT....
YOU NEED NOT SIGN THIS AGREEMENT TO OPEN AN ACCOUNT
WITH [NAME]. SEE 17 CFR 180.1-180.5.
Id. (emphasis added).
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CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has closed the book on the validity of arbitration
agreements in brokerage customer account agreements. The majority opinion
in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.'6 mandates the
enforcement of predispute arbitration agreements for any claims arising under
the securities statutes, whether they arise under the Securities Act or the
Exchange Act. Investors may no longer rely upon congressional provisions
for a federal judicial forum in both of the Acts.
The arbitration process has many benefits for the investor. Arbitration has
been shown to be quicker and cheaper than litigation for all parties. The
relaxed procedural nature of arbitration may also be a benefit. The majority
of arbitrated cases seem to result in awards for the investor. However,
arbitration has its disadvantages as well.
The lack of evidentiary standards and, more importantly, the lack of any
specification of the standard of law to be applied in arbitrations are weaknesses in the arbitration process. The lack of a written opinion, the industryoriented background of the arbitrators, the limited availability of appellate
avenues after arbitration and the involuntary nature of the arbitration agreements are also matters of concern. The McMahon and Rodriguez cases will
only fuel the already increasing number of arbitrations that both the SEC
and the NASD will be unable to effectively review. Investors should be made
aware of the competing costs and benefits before surrendering their right to
a judicial forum.
The Supreme Court decisions leave the SEC as the last protector of the
individual investor. SEC approval of the SROs' proposed rule changes was
a welcome move towards a fair and efficient system of arbitration as
administered by the SROs. However, the SEC failed to rectify important
problem areas within this procedure. The SEC must now be very diligent in
monitoring these rule changes as they are put into practice. The SEC should
also specifically act to correct the problem of mandatory arbitration by
imposing rules that mirror the CFTC rules in not allowing brokers to require
arbitration agreements. Only in this fashion can the goals of the securities
statutes, certainly more significant and far-reaching than the Arbitration Act,
be satisfied. And, more importantly, only in this way can the confidence of
individual investors, necessary to the health and liquidity of our capital
markets, be restored.

168. 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989).
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APPBNDIX

Summary of Data Included in the Deloitte Survey*

Percentage of
total cases
Amount** of
original claim
Amount** of
damage award
Amount** of
legal costs to
the firms
Awards as % of
original claim
Legal cost as %
of awards
Average elapsed
time (days)

Litigated

Arbitrated

Litigation
Transferred to
Arbitration

27.16%

58.44%

14.40%

63,901

20,781

-20,976

41,757

1,659

4,067

2,115

6,182

1,321

1,169

1,740

2,909

2.60%

19.57%

10.08%

14.81%

79.66%

28.75%

82.75%

47.06%

599

434

1,056

577

All
Arbitrated
72.84%

* Total Number of Cases Surveyed = 420
** Dollar Amounts in Thousands

Source: Letter from Deloitte Haskins & Sells to the New York Stock Exchange (undated)
567
(copy on file at the Indiana Law Journal).
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